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This article proposes a framework to investigate the consequences of natural disasters. 
This framework is based on the disaggregation of Input-Output tables at the business 
level, through the representation of the regional economy as a network of production 
units. This framework accounts for (i) limits in business production capacity; (ii) 
forward propagations through input shortages; and (iii) backward propagations through 
decreases in demand. Adaptive behaviors are included, with the possibility for 
businesses to replace failed suppliers, entailing changes in the network structure. This 
framework suggests that disaster costs depend on the heterogeneity of losses and on the 
structure of the affected economic network. The model reproduces economic collapse, 
suggesting that it may help understand the difference between limited-consequence 
disasters and disasters leading to systemic failure. 
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Recently, natural disasters have raised a growing concern about the response of
local economies to large exogenous shocks. Clearly, our ability to assess the total
long-term cost of a large scale event, such as the Katrina’s landfall, is very poor.
Not only is it very difﬁcult to evaluate direct losses due to a natural disaster, i.e. the
repairing or replacement cost of the assets that have been destroyed or damaged,
but it is even more difﬁcult to evaluateindirect losses.Indirect losses are sometimes
even difﬁcult to deﬁne, as shown by Rose (2004) who proposes useful deﬁnitions
and reviews the risks of double-counting.
These indirect impacts are due to complex interactions between businesses and
other economic agents. In particular, they arise from production bottlenecks
through chains of suppliers and producers. These bottlenecks may even be made
more likely by the modern production organization (e.g., production on demand,
small or absence of inventories, limited number of suppliers) that makes each pro-
duction unit more dependent on the ability of its suppliers to produce in due time
the required amount of intermediate goods. The assessment of the cost of these
interactions is all the more difﬁcult because they are highly variable (from one
event to another, from one region to another) and depend deeply on the economic
structure and on the shock speciﬁcities. It seems obvious, for instance, that a given
amount of damages would have more serious consequences if the damages affect
mainly an infrastructure sector (e.g., electricity production and distribution) than if
these damages are spread equitably among sectors.
These questions have already been the topic of intense modeling effort (Rose et al.,
1997; Brookshire et al., 1997; Cochrane, 2004; Okuyama, 2004; Okuyama and
Chang, 2004; Rose and Liao, 2005; Hallegatte, 2008). A useful review of these
methods, and of their shortcomings, is proposed in Rose (2004). In these studies,
as in multi-sector RBC literature (e.g. Horwath, 1998; Dupor, 1998), however, the
economy is described as an ensemble of economic sectors, which interact through
an input-output table. As shown in Hallegatte (2008), however, such a representa-
tion of the economy may be insufﬁcient to model disaster consequences. Indeed,
business interruptions and production losses due to production bottlenecks after a
disaster can arise from many small-scale mechanisms, including supplier failures,
lifeline and transportation perturbations, impossibility for customers or workers to
reach the production location, or bankruptcy of individual businesses. These mech-
anisms are very difﬁcult to represent at the sector scale and need a much more
detailed analysis (see, e.g., Haimes and Jiang, 2001).
Moreover, these complex interactions between ﬁrms are likely to be an important
source of nonlinearity and a model that would not take them into account is at
risk of underestimating indirect losses. It is interesting to note, for instance, that
2the 2004 hurricanes 1 did not have the widespread consequences on the Florida
economic system that hurricane Katrina had in Louisiana (compare, for instance,
McCarty and Smith (2005) on the 2004 hurricanes and Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2006) on the impact of Katrina). Of course, this is due to the facts (i) that Katrina
was more violent than the 2004 hurricanes, and caused far more direct damages;
(ii) that the area in the path of Katrina was evacuated, and many people had to leave
their houses and could not return after the landfall; and (iii) that New-Orleans suf-
fered from ﬂoods, which were not insured for, making the recovery more difﬁcult.
But the most important factor is probably the fact that Katrina affected the systemic
functioning of the Louisiana and New Orleans economies, by disrupting the eco-
nomic system in such a way that even businesses that did not suffer any damage
could not function normally. These disruptions made economic production almost
impossible and, therefore, lead to an almost complete collapse of the local econ-
omy. On the opposite, the losses due to the 2004 hurricanes were important, but
they spread over a wider area and did not impair the whole Florida economic pro-
ductionin2004,ensuringthatreconstructioncouldbeeasilyandrapidlyperformed.
It seems, therefore, that there is a threshold between the 2004 losses in Florida and
the 2005 losses in New Orleans: in the former case, losses remained below a crit-
ical level and did not impact too badly crucial sectors and, as a consequence, the
economy remained able to function almost normally in spite of the losses; in the
latter case, losses exceeded a critical level, and the economic system was basically
paralyzed by the losses, making the reconstruction very difﬁcult 1 . The main aim
of this paper is to provide insights on this threshold and its determinants.
To do so, this article proposes a disaggregated Input-Output (IO) model, in which
the economy is described as a network of production units (PU), in the line of
Delli Gatti et al. (2005); Battiston et al. (2007); Weisbuch and Battiston (2008).
This network is subject to shocks, due to disasters, and reacts with various adapta-
tion processes.
The aim of this ﬁrst analysis is to get a better understanding of the mechanisms at
stake, and to identify the decisive parameters in the recovery of a local economy. It
is important to note that the model that is proposed in this paper disregards many
essential mechanisms (e.g., impact on consumer demand, links with non-affected
regions, recovery and reconstruction process), so that the model cannot provide
a quantitative assessment of the cost of any given disaster. The model, therefore,
cannot be considered as an operational model. So far, the model proposes explana-
tions and models for stylized facts that have been observed in disaster aftermaths,
and highlightswhere more research is needed. Hopefully, follow-up papers will ex-
pand this ﬁrst tentativemodel to take into account additional dimensions of disaster
consequences. By identifying decisive parameters, moreover, this analysis suggests
1 During the 2004 hurricane season, four hurricanes made landfall on Florida: Charley,
Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne.
1 See an analysis of the link between reconstruction capacity and disaster total cost in
Hallegatte et al. (2007).
3that additional data collection is necessary and emphasizes which data should be
collected.
The next section reviews brieﬂy (and non-exhaustively) empirical ﬁndings from
the literature on direct and indirect impacts of historical extreme events, to justify
our modeling approach. Section 3 presents the features of our disaggregated input-
output model. Section 4 uses then a simple synthetic disaster to investigate the
model behavior, providing both a reference simulation, with our best-guess param-
eters, and a sensitivityanalysison themostimportantfeatures of our model,namely
the characteristics of the adaptation process, the number of PUs in the economy, the
redundancy in the economic system, and the level of inventories. Section 5 inves-
tigates systematically the inﬂuence of loss heterogeneity on total economic losses,
with distributions of direct losses inspired by the landfall of Katrina on Louisiana.
Section 6 concludes and emphasizes needs for future research.
2 Economic impacts of historical extreme events
Theliteratureabouttheimpactsof naturaldisastersisabundantandcannotbeeasily
summarized in a few paragraphs. This section focuses therefore on the most salient
stylized facts of disaster consequences, and especially on the impacts on production
systems, i.e. on the ﬁrms and their network.
Tierney (1997) studies the impacts of the Northridge earthquake in 1994, and pro-
vides a very useful quantitative assessment of direct and indirect impacts. Accord-
ing to her analysis, 57% of the businesses of the affected area suffered some degree
of physical damage in the earthquake. Most importantly, damages were distributed
very heterogeneously among ﬁrms: the mean loss was $156 273, while the median
loss was only $5 000. A number of businessesreported very high losses, the highest
loss being $14 million, but minor damages were widespread.
As far as indirect impacts are concerned, the earthquake produced extensive life-
line service interruption and the loss of lifelines was a larger source of business
interruption than direct physical damages. In addition to direct physical impacts
and the interruption of critical utility services, the disaster caused business losses
through the disruption of customer and worker ability to reach business locations.
Moreover, nearly one business in four had problems with the delivery of goods and
services followingthe earthquake and, onaverage, businesseswere closedfor about
2 days. In this case, direct damages to the business building were only the seventh
cause of closure, present in 32% of the cases.
On the same event, Gordon et al. (1998) and Boarnet (1998) conﬁrm the fact that
indirectimpactsare essential.Theyﬁndthatasubstantialshareofbusinessinterrup-
tion were due to off-site problems, such as disruptions in the transportation system
that restricted the movement of goods and supplies and the inability of employees
4to come to work. It is very important to note that, irrespective of their own individ-
ual levels of damage and disruption, ﬁrms had more difﬁculty to remain active if
they were located in the high-impact area.
Kroll et al. (1991) investigate the consequences of the Loma Prieta earthquake
(1989) on smallbusinessand on their ability to recover after the disaster.According
to their analysis, the long term recovery of a small business depends on its location,
the amount of direct losses it suffered, its level of inventories, and on local char-
acteristics of the economy. For example, the economic consequences of the Loma
Prieta earthquake have been limited in Santa Cruz, because this location was lo-
cated farther from the earthquake epicenter, but also because (i) this economy was
particularly diversiﬁed;(ii) the transportation network was very redundant; and (iii)
the closure duration of utilities was short. They also ﬁnd that small businesses suf-
fered more from the disaster than larger ones, mainly because they depend more
strongly on the local economy and because they cannot turn as easily to other cus-
tomers after the disaster.
Webb et al. (2002) examine the long-term impacts of two natural disasters on ﬁrms:
the Loma Prieta earthquake (1989) and the hurricane Andrew (1992). Even if most
of the ﬁrms in the affected region claimed that they were better off after than before
the disaster 2 , in the Dade County, where hurricane Andrew caused most of the
losses, ﬁrms were in majority worse off after the disaster than before, showing that
individual ﬁrm situations depend strongly on the loss density. Also, the ﬁrms that
were present in a national or international market, i.e. the ﬁrms whose clients were
not exclusively in the damaged area, were more likely to recover than the ﬁrms that
only sold goods or services within their local market. Finally, they conclude that,
among the determinants of recovery, both direct and indirect damages are decisive.
The indirect impacts of a disaster on a production network depend on which sectors
suffer the most from direct damages. For instance, the water and electricity sectors
play essential roles for the whole economy, and their vulnerability to disaster can
be crucial. In Rose et al. (2007), for instance, the authors mention results by the
National Federation of Independent Business concerning the impacts of the Los
Angeles black-out in 2001. They found that one half of affected ﬁrms were forced
to decrease their operations. Approximately 15.2% of ﬁrms suffered from indirect
effects (because of disruptions in services and transportation), and 13.7% could not
sell their production because the customers were not able to come. Importantly,
they evaluates that the cost of the blackout was twice the cost of direct effects. In
Rose and Liao (2005) and Rose et al. (2007), the authors model these effects, using
a general equilibrium framework where adaptation capacity is taken into account
usingelasticities of substitution.They showboth that indirect effects are potentially
large and that adaptation mechanisms can be very efﬁcient in reducing these indi-
rect losses (by up to 86% in their case study on a terrorist attack on the electricity
power grid serving Los Angeles County).
2 Macroeconomic changes at the national level may have played a role in this change.
5These ﬁndings suggest that indirect impacts are often signiﬁcant and highlight the
need to focus on the mechanisms that lead to such impacts. The indirect losses on
the whole economy depend on which sector is affected by direct losses, for instance
the disruption in the transportation network and lifelines are a widespread cause of
indirect losses in disaster aftermaths. The ﬁrm location plays a signiﬁcant role in
its ability to recover, and the indirect losses depend on the production network
characteristics and on the damages heterogeneity among ﬁrms. These facts imply
that modeling the economy as a set of interacting sectors is not enough to assess
disaster costs, and that a much ﬁner modeling, e.g. at the production-unit scale, is
necessary.
3 ARIO-network, a model at the production-unit scale
The ARIO-network model is an extension of the Input-Output ARIO model pre-
sented in Hallegatte (2008). But while ARIO is disaggregated at the sector level,
ARIO-network is disaggregated at the ﬁrm level and introduces inventory dynam-
ics.
ARIO-network describes how each ﬁrm from each sector uses input from other
ﬁrms to produce goods or services. This disaggregated model takes into account
the interaction between production units and is in line of Delli Gatti et al. (2005);
Battiston et al. (2007); Weisbuch and Battiston (2008), except that the modeled
network is built to be consistent with IO table at the sector scale. It represents the
fact that each ﬁrm relies on regional suppliers and clients and that a decrease in a
ﬁrm production can result in ripple effects through chains of suppliers and clients.
The extent of these ripple effects depends on whether there are alternative produc-
ers elsewhere and on how much time the perturbation lasts. But it also depends
on adjustment mechanisms. For instance, when a supplier is not able to produce
enough, the production of its client does not automatically decrease, because ad-
justments that allow it to maintain production can take place: (i) it may be possible
for the client to import intermediate goods from outside the damaged area; or (ii)
the client may ﬁnd an alternative local producer that is able to produce more than
its usual production and replace the failing one; or (iii) the client may have enough
inventories to wait for its suppliers to restore their activity.
In this ﬁrst attempt to assess disaster consequences, we focus on the impact on the
production system, and we do not model the impact on households, and the corre-
sponding effect on ﬁnal demand and labor supply. We consider a closed production
system, without imports and exports. We also disregard the reconstruction process,
assuming that production units that are damaged will remain damaged for ever: we
investigate, therefore, how the economic system can adjust to the deﬁnitive loss of
Production Units (PUs), without pretending to reproduce the full effect of a dis-
aster. Finally, we did not include in the model the possibility of business ﬁnancial
6bankruptcy, which is an important process in the case of Katrina. In future works,
households, reconstruction and bankruptcies will be implemented into the model,
in order to be able to assess the overall consequences of natural disasters.
This model version is not, therefore, able to quantify the economic losses caused by
a disaster. In spite of its limited scope, however, the current model version already
provides interesting insights into disaster consequences, and explores the difﬁcul-
ties in quantifying them.
3.1 The economic network
3.1.1 From sectoral to disaggregated IO tables
There is no data that describe in a comprehensive manner the economic network
of any region at the production-unit (PU) scale. This situation will not change in
the near future: such a data set would be extremely difﬁcult to collect and constant
changes in the economic system would make it obsolete before its completion.
But there exist innovative and interesting attempts to improve our understanding of
plant-to-plant relationships. For instance, Hortacsu and Syverson (2007) combine
information from various sources to build useful plant-to-plant databases. This type
of work providesinformationaboutthe network structure (e.g., number of suppliers
per plant in various sectors). However, it is unlikely that it will ever provide the full
description of the economic network that would be needed for an explicit modeling
of the economic network.
This is why the disaggregated model proposed here is based on a synthetic
production-unit input-output (PU-IO) table, developed from a sectoral input-output
table and from simplenetwork characteristics (e.g., number of PUs per sector, num-
ber of suppliers per PU, number of clients per PU). Compared with previous works
(e.g., Battiston et al., 2007), the difference here is that we created a PU-IO table
that is consistent with aggregated IO data at the sector level and with network char-
acteristics that we chose in an ad hoc manner.
Because of numerical limitations, the current model represents an economy that is
not as complex as the real one. For instance, the Louisiana economy has about 100
000 production units (see below) whereas in this paper, as a ﬁrst step, the modeled
economy consists only of 500 to 1000 production units.
We started from the 15 sectors of the Bureau of Economics Analysis IO table. The
sectors are: (1) Agriculture; (2) Mining and extraction; (3) Utilities; (4) Construc-
tion ; (5) Manufacturing; (6) Wholesale trade; (7) Retail trade; (8) Transportation;
(9) Information; (10) Finance; (11) Business services; (12) Education; (13) Arts
and food; (14) Other services; (15) Government. From this U.S. table, a regional
table for Louisiana has been built, using Gross State Product for Louisiana (see
7Sector Agric. Min. Constr. Util. Manuf. Whole Retail. Transp
Proportion 4% 2% 2% 8% 4% 6% 18% 4%
Sector Info. Finance Busi.serv. Educ., health Food, Art Serv. Gov.
Proportion 2% 12% 12% 12% 10% 10% 4%
Table 1
The proportion of production units among sectors.
details in Hallegatte, 2008) and simple assumptions about the proportion of each
sector production that is exported outside the region.
Building the disaggregated IO table requires then to know the number of PUs in
each sector or, if the full economy cannot be modeled, the proportion of these PUs
for each sector relative to the total number. We used data on Louisiana in 2004,
from the Census bureau, which give the number of PUs per sector and their size
distribution (www.census.gov). The proportion of PUs per sector is given in Tab.1.
Using this information, we expand the sectoral IO table into a PU-IO table, which
describes the exchanges between all PUs of the local economy. Obviously,this PU-
IO table is much larger than the sectoral one, since its size is NxN, where N is the
number of PUs in the economy. Also, this table contains mostly zeros, since most
PUs have no direct relationship with each other.
For simplicity, we assume that all the PUs from a given sector produce the same
commodity and have the same size. In a future evolution of the model, it could be
the case that PUs among a sector produce imperfectly substitutable commodities
and have different sizes. In the current version, however, computational limitations
on the size of the modeled economy makes it impossible to reproduce the observed
distribution of plant sizes, and we chose to assume that they have the same size
in each sector (PUs from different sectors have different sizes). All PUs produce
and exchange intermediate consumptiongoods and services, and produce ﬁnal con-
sumption goods and services for local demand. We assume that all PUs need input
from PUs that belong to all the other sectors. Also, each PU has several suppliers
from each sector. Given that we have assumed that all PUs from the same sector
have the same characteristics (same productionand same size), we assume that they
have the same number of suppliers.
Of course, there are many restrictions to the PU-IO table structure (see an example
on detailed sectoral IO tables in Carvalho, 2008). For instance, the sum of the ith
line is the production of the ith PU that is sold to other PUs and must, therefore,
be consistent with the sum of the ith column, when sales to consumers, wages and
proﬁts are taken into account. In this article, we do not try to investigateall possible
network structures, focusing on the agent behavior modeling. As a consequence,
we use a single network structure, described hereafter, that satisﬁes the consistency
constraints. We are well aware of the existence of other possible structures, which
could yield different model results. Because of length constraints, however, an in-
8vestigation of various possible network structures is left for future research.
We deﬁne the sectoral connection matrix Cp,l, which is composed of 0 and 1 and
describes which clients from the sector p buys intermediate goods from which sup-
pliers of the sector l. The component Cp,l(i,j) is equal to one if the ith PU from
sector p buys goods from the jth PU from sector l, and to zero otherwise. Here, we





















































The number of suppliers from the sector l of a PU from the sector p is given by
αp,l×nl where nl is the total number of ﬁrms from sector l and αp,l is a redundancy
parameter. Similarly, the number of clients in sector p of a PU from sector l is
given by αp,l × np. Once αp,l, nl, np are chosen, the total amount of exchanges
between the two sectors, given by the aggregated IO table, is dividedby the number
of transactions, which is equal to the number of 1 in the matrix Cp,l, to get the
connection size γp,l, i.e the amount bought by one PU from sector p to one PU
from sector l. All the γp,l · Cp,l matrix are then gathered in a large matrix A, the
PU-IO matrix, which describes the amounts exchanged between all the PUs of the
economy. During the adaptation process, PUs will have the opportunity to change
the structure of A, by adding new links and by strengthening or weakening existing
links.
The values of the αp,l are chosen to set the density of the production network and
the redundancy of the links between sectors. The PU-IO matrix that is used here is
obviously very distinctive and a more in-depth research on graphs would probably
suggest different types of networks that are consistent with the sectoral IO table.
For instance, the “conﬁguration model” (Newman, 2003) could be used to create
networks with different structures. As a ﬁrst analysis in this direction, however, this
simple matrix form has been used.
As one can notice, all the vertices do not have the same degree. For instance, PUs
from small sectors, i.e. sectors that have few PUs, have many clients and suppliers
and vice-et-versa. For instance, power plants have a very high degree, since they
are “hubs” in the network. The network of sales and purchases can be seen as an
9oriented graph, where orientation corresponds to the fact that the interaction is a





depends on the vertex sector size (with respect to other sector sizes) and on the
redundancy parameters.
3.1.2 Stockable and non-stockable goods
Some commodities, for instance those produced by the manufacturing sector, can
be stocked, while it is almost impossible to stock electricity. As a consequence, in
case of black-out, all PUs that depend on electricity will stop producing ; while if
a PU from the manufacturing sector is damaged, its client will have the possibility
to draw from their inventories in order to produce at least a fraction of their usual
production for a certain period of time.
To take into account this difference, we introduce inventories in the production
process. Practically, all PUs have inventories of the goods or services produced
by each of their suppliers. At each point in time, production in all PUs is done
using inventories only. These inventories are measured in numbers of days of pre-
event consumption by the PU. For instance, an automaker factory may have a tire
inventory allowing it to produce cars during 15 days at the pre-event production
pace. For simplicity,non-stockable goods – like electricity – are modeled assuming
that their inventories cannot be larger than what is needed to produce during one
day. It means that, if electricity is shut down, production in the affected area will be
stopped the next day only. This assumption is not fully satisfying, but it allows for
a useful simpliﬁcation of the model without changing in a signiﬁcant manner the
results.
3.2 A disaggregated model of the production system
In this model, like in Battiston et al. (2007), we represent the independent behavior
of each PU. Each PU, indeed, acts according (i) to demand, which depends on the
orders it receives from its clients; (ii) to input availability, which depends on its
supplier production; and (iii) to its own internal constraints. Of course, like in any
agent-based model, the behavioral rules that are used in this model are somehow
ad hoc, and other functional forms would also be possible 3 . We assume, however,
that these behavioral rules are realistic and that, with a sufﬁciently large number
of PUs, the aggregated results should not be too sensitive to the detailed modeling
of agent behaviors. This assumption will be tested in details in Section 4, using
systematic sensitivity analyses.
3 These behavioral rules, however, are not more ad hoc than the Cobb-Douglas production
functions that are used in most classical growth models.
10We assume that P is the vector of outputs of the different PUs and A is the PU-
IO matrix. As already stated, we do not model here households and reconstruction
and we assume that ﬁnal demand is not impacted by the disaster. Final demand,
therefore, remains constant in our model. The production is used to satisfy the
demand of intermediate goods and ﬁnal demand. The equilibrium equation is then:
P = AP + C (2)
Where C is the vector of ﬁnal demands and P the equilibrium production. Classi-
cally, the optimal production is:
P
0 =( I − A)
−1C (3)
P 0 would be the production if the production capacities were not bounded and
if there were no inventory. In the present model, we will, however, consider the
production capacity of each PU – a PU cannot produce more than what it has been
designed to produce – and the impact of inventories on demands.
3.2.1 Inventories and demand model
We deﬁne Di(t), as the demand to the ith PU at the time t. This demand consists
of ﬁnal demand and of PU-to-PU demand (i.e. intermediate consumption demand).
The PUs, indeed, produce commodities by drawing from their commodity invento-
ries. They have then to order new inputs to their suppliers, in order to restore their
inventories. The inventory level at the end of each time step is used to determine
the demand to suppliers.
We assume that the PU i has an inventory S(i,j) of the commodity produced by
the PU j, and that the demand of the PU i to its suppliers j is designed to restore
its inventory S(i,j) to a level equal to a given number of days ni
j of consumption
at the production level needed to satisfy its clients 4 . As an example, consider an
automaker factory that had a tire inventory allowing for 10 days of production at
the pre-event production pace. If the demand to this plant increases by 10 percent,
the plant will increase its tire inventory, such that it will have a tire inventory that
still allows for 10 days of production at the pace needed to satisfy this increased
demand. The tire inventory, therefore, will also be increased by 10 percent. On the
opposite, if demand decreases, the level of inventory will be reduced by the same
fraction.
4 Of course, if A(i,j)=0 , i.e. if the PU i is not a client of the PU j, then S(i,j)=0 .















· A(i,j) − S(i,j)
 
(4)
Where Di(t − 1) is the demand directed toward the PU i (by all its clients) at
the previous time step. The parameter P ini
i is the pre-event production of ﬁrm i,
assumed equal to demand in the initial situation. To produce P ini
i , the PU i needs
an amount A(i,j) of inputs from the PU j. So, the ﬁrst term of the right-hand side
of Eq. (4), A(i,j)Di(t − 1)/P ini
i , is the amount of commodity needed by the ith
PU to satisfy the demand at the previous time step Di(t − 1). The second term of
the RHS of Eq. (4) represents the orders that make the inventory converge toward
its equilibrium value, i.e. toward ni
j days of current consumption. The parameter τ
is the characteristic time of the inventory restoration. In the following, we assume
that τ =6days. This choice is arbitrary, and there are no data available on this
information.
This modeling provides the total demand directed toward each ﬁrm j at the time







Without constraint, each PU j would produce at each time step t the exact level
of demand Dj(t). But production can be lower than demand either (i) because its
production capacity is insufﬁcient; or because (ii) its inventories are insufﬁcient as
a result of the inability of other PUs to produce enough (forward propagation). The
production capacity of each PU depends on its stock of productive capital (e.g.,
factory, equipments), and on the direct damages to the ﬁrm capital (e.g., a ﬁrm that
suffer from disaster damages can produce less).
The capacity and inventoryconstraintsare described by the followingrelationships:
• Limitation by production capacity:
Independantly of its suppliers, the production capacity P
cap






i (1 − Δi) (6)
5 In this equation and in the following ones, A(i,j), O(i,j) and S(i,j) depend on the time
step t, but we omit it for simplicity.
6 This total demand is the equivalent of the desired output of Battiston et al. (2007).
12Where P ini
i is the pre-event production of this PU, assumed equal to the nor-
mal level of production. The variable Δi is the percentage of the productive cap-
ital of the PU i that has been destroyed by the disaster.
• Limitation by inventories:
A PU can also be limited by insufﬁcient inventories. Of course, since all PUs
from a sector s produce the same commodity s,i faP Ui has two suppliers from
sector s (the PUs j1 and j2), it can compensate an insufﬁcient inventory S(i,j1)
using more commodity from the inventory S(i,j2). To model this compensation,
we deﬁne the total inventory of commodity s, Stot(i,s), which is equal to the
sum of the inventories owned by the PU i of the commodities produced by all





Also, in the pre-event situation, the PU i produces an amount P ini
i and con-
sumes an amount A(i,j) from each PU j. So, it consumes a total amount





As a consequence, with an amount of available inventories Stot(i,s) for the








In this equation, P ini
i /Atot(i,s) is the amount of commodity s needed by the
PU i to produce one unit of commodity. Stot(i,s)P ini
i /Atot(i,s) is therefore the
maximum production of i allowed by the amount of commodity s.
• Taking into account both production capacity and limited inventories, the maxi-








Actual production P a





i (t),D i(t)) (11)
The vector P a
i (t) is the vector of actual production by each PU, taking into account
the two production constraints 7 . These constraints then spread into the economy:
if a ﬁrm reveals unable to produce enough to satisfy the demand, it will both (i)
ration its clients, and (ii) demand less to its suppliers. These two effects, forward
and backward propagations, affect the entire economy.
7 This actual production is the equivalent of the effective output of Battiston et al. (2007).
133.2.3 Market modeling, rationing scheme and inventory dynamics
When a PU is not able to produce enough to satisfy demand, it has to ration its
clients. We have, therefore, to introduce a rationing scheme. In our framework, in
absence of market equilibrium, demand can be larger than actual production (in
such a case P a





















Some agents, therefore, must be rationed. The rationing scheme gives the sales and
purchases of each agent, depending on the demands and supplies of all the agents.
In the present case, since we are interested in disasters, there is only underproduc-
tion and the suppliers can sell all their production while clients only get a fraction
of their demand. In this model, we have assumed that the rationing scheme is a
proportional rationing scheme 8 (B´ enassy, 1984). The rationing fraction is equal






















In the model, the actual sales of PU i to PU j (O∗(j,i)) are those that increase the








where the term O∗
i,j is the increase in inventory thanks to purchases from the sup-
plier, and the last term is the decrease in inventory due to the commodity consump-
8 The problem of this rationing procedure is than it can theoretically be manipulated: an
agent can declare a higher demand to increase his transactions. In the present study, we
assume that PUs declare their true demand, that is to say the amount of intermediate good
they actually need to satisfy their own demand.
14tion needed to produce the amount P a
j (t).
3.3 Adaptation in the production system
When a ﬁrm is not able to satisfy demand, the economic system allows for some
ﬂexibility in order to maintain production. For instance, businesses can turn to new
suppliers or adjust the production processes to cope with a reduced availability
of some inputs. While Rose and Liao (2005) and Rose et al. (2007) focus on the
latter, we investigate here the former, i.e. how PUs can create new business re-
lations to cope with insufﬁcient production from their normal suppliers. It would
be possible to assume that this adaptation is made in an optimal way (using, e.g.,
a Ghosh model or the Cochrane (1997) approach). Here, we assume instead that
adaptation is carried out by individual agents in a decentralized manner. Such a
modeling is considered more realistic by the authors in disaster aftermaths, during
which perfect-market assumptions are not satisﬁed (e.g., concerning the presence
of rationing). The drawback of such a modeling is that it introduces many degrees
of freedom. These degrees of freedom, however, exist in the real world, since each
economic agent has to react independently to the disaster, and must therefore be
taken into account in the modeling approach.
If the ith PU is not able to satisfy demand and if the kth PU from the same sector is
able to produce more than current demand, the clients of the ith PU can turn to the
kth PU. The problem is that the kth PU may have additional production capacity
but it is unlikely to be able to satisfy the unsatisﬁed demands of all the former
clients of the ith PU. So, only a fraction of the unsatisﬁed demand to the ith PU
will be satisﬁed by the kth PU. The problem is that there is no simple or single way
of determining this fraction, and that multiple strategies are possible. The actual
outcome of the adaptation process will depend on many small-scale processes like
personal relationships between business owners and managers, or the existence of
risk management plans that include alternative suppliers in case of supply chain
disruption.
In such a situation of uncertainty and multiple possibilities, a deterministic model
may not be the most adequate tool. Instead, we introduce a stochastic module in-
spired by agent-based modeling approaches: a random process decides which frac-
tion of the unsatisﬁed demand of each PU shifts to each available PU. Of course,
various parameters inﬂuence this random process, and several modeling of the
adaptation process can be imagined. To cope with this large uncertainty, several
modeling will be proposed and compared in a systematic way in Section 4.2.
In practice, we model this adaptation process using the following algorithm.
As described above, P max
k is the maximum production of the PU k, limited by its
production capacity and by the lack of inputs from all the other sectors. If there
15exist PUs that are able to produce more than their current demand (i.e. there is k
such that P max
k (t) >D k(t)), some PUs will have the opportunity to turn to this
new supplier, leading to a modiﬁcation of the matrix A. We assume that each PU
can implement one adaptation action per day, i.e. creating an additional link with a
new supplier each day 9 .
The adaptation process follows this scheme: ﬁrst, among the PUs that have a de-
faulting supplier, we select the ﬁrst one that will adapt; second, this PU chooses
which PU will replace its defaulting supplier. In our model, the ﬁrst choice can be
done using three rules:
• Stochastic. The ﬁrst PU to capture the unused capacity is chosen randomly.
• The better-off ﬁrst. The PU that had the largest production at the previous time
step (relative to its initial production) has priority to capture unused production
capacities.
• The worst-off ﬁrst. The PU that had the lowest production at the previous time
step (relative to its initial production) has priority to capture unused production
capacities.
The second choice can be done using two rules:
• Alphabetical order. The PUs that need additional capacity turn ﬁrst on the ﬁrst
PU that has available resources.
• Largest capacity ﬁrst. The PUs that need additional capacity turn ﬁrst on the PU
that has the largest unused capacity.
Practically, these adaptation strategies lead to the multiplication by 10 or 100 of the
number of links,i.e. of the number of suppliers of each PU. Thisunrealistic result is
satisfying in a sense, because it seems obvious that, in absence of transaction costs
associated with the creation of a link, businesses have an interest in having as many
suppliers as possible, since it increases their robustness. So, the fact that this ﬁrst
module leads to a large multiplicationof the number of suppliers appears consistent
with what one can expect. Moreover, most connections added by this adaptation
process are of a negligible magnitude, which is again unrealistic is presence of
transactioncosts 10 .Tobemorerealistic,a restrictionofthenumberof suppliersper
PU is introduced, assumingthat a PU cannot deal with more than a given number of
suppliers. Once a PU has reached its maximum number of suppliers, the adaptation
process can continue but the PU can only adapt its demand level to the suppliers
it is already connected to. The maximum number of suppliers is assumed to be
1.5 times the initial number of suppliers. This choice is ad hoc, because no data is
available on this point. A systematic sensitivity analysis, however, is proposed in
Section 4.2.
9 Note that the adaptation is “supply-lead”: PUs that need supplies look for new suppliers,
while PUs that lost clients do not look for new clients.
10 One can notice that using an aggregated IO model is equivalent to a uniform distribution
of the risks, i.e. to the assumption that all PUs are connected to all PUs.
16Importantly, we assume that there is no adaptation in the non-stockable sectors,
because one cannot turn to another supplier of, e.g., electricity or water. This as-
sumption is clearly too strong, for example because water can be transported by
trucks and electricity can be locally produced using individual generating set if the
grid is affected. Rose and Liao (2005) also show how production process can be
adjusted to cope with water or electricity scarcity. Given their speciﬁcities, how-
ever, these sectors require a more detailed analysis than what can be proposed in
this article and this issue is left for future research.
As already stated, PUs cannot turn to importations to obtain additional interme-
diate goods in the current model version, as we focus in the present study on the
robustness of an independent economic network.
4 Investigating the model behavior using a synthetic disaster
This section investigates the model behavior and highlights the most important pa-
rameters. It uses synthetic disasters that help understand the model. It starts with a
description of a reference simulation, using our best-guess parameter values, and
then presents sensitivity analysis on four modeling choices and parameters: (i) the
characteristics of the adaptation process; (ii) the number of PUs in the economy;
(iii) the redundancy in the economic system; and (iv) the level of inventories. Ex-
cept when explicitly mentioned, parameter values are those shown in Tab. 2.
First simulations show a large vulnerability of the economy to the destruction of
PUs inthenon-stockablesectors(e.g., electricity,transportation,water). The deﬁni-
tive disappearance of one PU in these sectors lead the entire economy to collapse
and total output to go to zero in less than one month. This result is not surpris-
ing given that we did not allow for reconstruction or for the creation of new PUs
to compensate the disappearance of destroyed ones, and that no adaptation is al-
lowed in the non-stockable sectors like utilities or transportation. The destruction
of a PU in sectors where adaptation is not allowed spreads and makes the economy
collapse 11 . These resultsare inline withtheintuitionthattheimpactson thesenon-
stockable network-shaped sectors are major drivers to total losses and have thus to
be analyzed in priority (e.g., Rose et al., 1997; Boarnet, 1998; Gordon et al., 1998;
Rose and Liao, 2005; Rose et al., 2007). In this article, however, we will focus on
the propagation effects in other sectors.
11 Note that this result could be different with another network structure.
17Parameters Values
Number of PUs 500
Inventories in days 10





If the sectors where adaptation is allowed are affected, indeed, the situation is more
complex and requires more analysis. To get a better understanding of the model be-
havior in such a situation, we consider a disaster that affect 5% of the PUs from the
manufacturing sector and 1/30 of the PUs from the wholesale trade, making them
instantaneouslyand deﬁnitivelyunable to produce. This disaster has losses that are,
therefore, extremely heterogeneous among PUs. As a reference, we also indicated
the production level in case of a disaster that reduces the production capacity of all
PUs by 5% in the manufacturing sector and by 1/30 in the wholesale trade sector.
In these two cases, the total amounts of direct damages are equal, but damages are
equally distributed among the ﬁrms of one sector in the latter case, while they are
very heterogeneously distributed in the former one.
Fig. 1 shows the result of 50 simulations where the ﬁrst PU to adapt is chosen ran-
domly and turn toward the ﬁrst PU that has unused capacity, and where parameters
have the values of Tab. 2. The bold red line shows the result of the simulationwhere
all damages are equally distributed in affected sectors, while the thin lines are for
disasters with heterogeneously distributed damages. The left panel shows that, with
these hypotheses, a disaster with heterogeneous losses leads to much larger losses
than a disaster with homogenous losses, justifying the focus of the present paper.
In particular, the model can reproduce an economic collapse due to a disaster, sug-
gesting that it may be used to investigate the existence of a threshold in terms of
disaster losses and to discriminate between limited-consequence disasters (e.g., the
2004 hurricanes in Florida) and widespread-consequences disasters with systemic
failure (e.g., Katrina in New Orleans in 2005).
Moreover, this ﬁgure shows that various simulations can lead to very different re-
sults, with production loss after 100 days being between 3% (sensibly equivalent to
the homogenous disaster) and 100% (total economic collapse). The right panel is
an histogram of ﬁnal production (in fraction of initial production) that shows that
35% of the simulationslead to a collapse (or at least to a ﬁnal productionlower than
10% of initial production), while 20% of the simulations lead to a ﬁnal production
larger than 90% of initial production 12 .
12 This histogram may differ from the real result distribution because of the insufﬁcient
18These differences arise from the randomness in the adaptation process. Depending
on how the economic system reacts to the shock by creating new connections be-
tween PUs, production can be maintained or not. Basically, the outcome depends
on whether the economic system is able to create new links such that destroyed PUs
are isolated from the rest of the economic system. The fundamental question is how
creating these links can be done at a decentralized level, each PU acting on its own
like in the real world. From our analysis, the aggregate outcome depends on the
many individual PU decisions and the network may be able to restore its viability
or not. According to these results, the consequences of a natural disaster will be
largely driven by uncountable adaptation actions undertaken at the production-unit
level, making their assessment extremely difﬁcult.
The large range of possible outcomes of our model, in response to a unique disaster
and with unchanged parameters, may appear surprising. There is no established
evidence,however,thatadisasterimpactinganeconomycan haveonlyonepossible
outcome and that the details of the adaptationprocess cannot inﬂuence signiﬁcantly
the outcome, like in our model. Moreover, we model a small economy, with only
500 PUs. In such a small economy, the importance of the choice made by one
PU can be essential, while the importance of individual decisions is likely to be
milder in a larger economy 13 . This idea will be conﬁrmed by a sensitivity analysis
presented in Section 4.3 and 4.4.
Mostimportantly,as shownfor instanceinSection5 andinFig.8, thelarge range of
possible outcomes does not prevent the model from providing interesting insights,
because the likelihoodof each outcome depend on the characteristics of the disaster
(allowing to distinguish between more or less serious disasters) and of the affected
economies (allowing to discuss the resilience of different economies). For instance,
a small disaster can lead to a large economic impact, but it does so only rarely, in
a few simulations: in most simulations, such a disaster leads to a mild aggregate
impact. A large disaster, on the other hand, causes a large aggregate impact in most
simulations, and a small impact only in a few simulations.
Our results, therefore, support the idea that it is more relevant to produce disaster
cost assessment in the form of probabilistic results (e.g., probability distribution
function of the total losses, or histograms as in the right panel of Fig. 1) instead of
“best guess” estimates. In the same way, risk reduction strategies may have to be
assessed using probabilistic measures, even when the event characteristics are ﬁxed
number of simulations, which is due to computational time limitation.
13 This problem echoes that of statistical mechanics, where ﬂuctuations in aggregate vari-
ables decrease with the number of particles. At the thermodynamic limit, with many par-
ticles, aggregate variables can be modeled in a deterministic way. With fewer particles,
aggregate variables can vary signiﬁcantly and a probabilistic approach is required. Our
economic modeling faces the same difﬁculties and it seems that, with 500 PUs, we are
still far from a “thermodynamic limit,” making it necessary to model the aggregate variable
(total production) in a probabilistic manner. It is possible that, with much more PUs, total
production will become deterministic. These hypotheses will be tested in future research.





























































Fig. 1. Left panel: 50 simulations of the synthetic disaster in an economy with 500 PUs,
assuming the Stochastic/Alphabetical adaptation process. The bold red line shows the result
if all damages are equally distributed in the affected sectors. Right panel: Histogram of the
ﬁnal situation.
(usingstatementslike “if a M8earthquake hitsthe locationA, recoveryplans would
reduce by x% the probability of a y% reduction in output”). Even though Monte
Carlo analysis of disaster consequences is widely used in disaster assessment, our
results suggest that the use of probabilistic measures is not only made necessary
by the randomness of natural disasters and of the corresponding direct losses (e.g.,
fragility curves), but also by the randomness in the response by economic agents.
Our model reproduces frequent economic collapses, while such collapses are ex-
ceptionalafter knownhistoricaldisasters.Thisdifference between observationsand
model results can, however, be explained by three factors:
• First,reconstructionisnotmodeled,makingitnecessary forthenetworktoadjust
very efﬁciently. With recovery and reconstruction, most businesses can restore
their operation in a few days or weeks (Kroll et al., 1991; Tierney, 1997), and it
is likely that the efﬁciency of network adaptation would only inﬂuence the deep-
ness of the trough, without leading to a collapse even in the most pessimistic
scenarios. Our results are not, therefore, in contradiction with observations, but
the comparison with observations stresses the need to include recovery and re-
construction in the model.
• Second, these model simulations are carried out with a closed 500-PU economy,
while real economies are in practice much larger and well connected with the
rest of the world.
• Third, the current network structure in the model is very speciﬁc and may not
represent correctly real economies. In particular, small world networks may be
more robust and more realistic than our current network (e.g. Callaway et al.,
2000; Corso et al., 2003; Newman, 2003; Cowan and Jonard, 2004). Future re-
search will focus on the resilience of other network structures, derived from the-
oretical analysis or empirical evidences (e.g. Carvalho, 2008).
20Considering the high level of uncertainty in many components of this model, the
following sections propose sensitivityanalyses on the most uncertain modeling and
parameters of the model. With such a model, sensitivity analyses are mainly meant
to identify where more research is most needed.
4.2 Sensitivity to the adaptation modeling
One of the main results of this study is that the adaptation process is an essential
component in disaster cost assessment. First, we investigate the adaptation pro-
cess itself, i.e. the choice between the various strategies described in Section 3.3
(stochastic/better-off ﬁrst/worst-off ﬁrst; largest capacity ﬁrst/alphabetical). Sec-
ond, we investigate the limitation to the number of suppliers.
4.2.1 Adaptation process
To assess the inﬂuence of adaptation process modeling, we compared four adapta-
tion processes in addition to the one proposed in the reference simulation presented
in Fig. 1. First, the adaptation process is modeled assuming that the better-off PUs
are ﬁrst to capture the unused resources as additional suppliers,or that the worst-off
companies are the ﬁrst to capture them. The second dimension concerns the alter-
native suppliers: when a PU looks for a new supplier to compensate for the loss of
a historical supplier, it can turn toward the PU that has the largest unused capacity
ﬁrst, or to the ﬁrst available supplier (in alphabetical order).
Figure 2 shows the results of this sensitivity analysis. On the upper panels, the
better-offPUs are ﬁrst tocapture theusedresources; onthe bottompanel,theworst-
off PUs are the ﬁrst ones. On the left hand side, the PUs turns ﬁrst toward the PUs
that have the largest unused capacity; on the right hand side, they turn to any PU,
chosen randomly among those that have available capacity. This ﬁgure shows that
the adaptation process is much more efﬁcient if the better-off PUs can capture ﬁrst
the unused resources, and slightly more efﬁcient if they turn ﬁrst toward the PUs
that have the largest unused capacity 14 .
The adaptation order seems decisive in the ability of the economy to recover. From
many simulations, it appears that the most favorable order is when the ﬁrms that
have the largest production relative to their initial production have priority, and
when they turn ﬁrst on the ﬁrms which can produce the most relative to their de-
mand. Indeed, thisis a way of allowingas manyﬁrms as possibleto adapt: the ﬁrms
that can produce the most relative to their initial production are those that need less
input from alternative suppliers, leaving capacity for other ﬁrms. This process can
also be understood as a process in which the most affected ﬁrms are “sacriﬁced”
to protect the least affected ones. This results is interesting in that it suggests a
14 This result is conﬁrmed by the analysis of histograms (not shown).








































































































Fig. 2. Consequence of the synthetic disaster in an economy with 500 PUs, with different
adaptation processes. On the upper panels, the adaptation follows the “better-off” process:
the less affected PUs look ﬁrst to suppliers with unused resources. On the bottom panels,
the adaptation follows the “worst-off” process: the most affected PUs are the ﬁrst to look
for new suppliers. On the left hand side, PUs select the ﬁrst supplier with unused resources
(Alphabetical). On the right hand side, PUs turn ﬁrst toward suppliers with the largest
unused resources.
counter-intuitive strategy to help affected region cope with disasters, by allocating
scarce production to the least affected businesses 15 .
4.2.2 Limitation of the number of suppliers.
Previous simulations were carried out assuming that the number of suppliers and
clients per PU could not exceed 1.5 times the initialvalue. To investigatethe impor-
tance of thispoint,thissection assumesa stochastic/alphabeticaladaptationprocess
and varies the maximum number of suppliers and clients.
Figure 3 shows the results of simulation with different values for the maximum
15 Of course, this strategy is assessed from an efﬁciency point-of-view only, while equity,
ethical, and political aspects need to be accounted for. In particular, focusing aid on the
least affected businesses would be unacceptable if transfers are not organized to help the
most affected households. Moreover, the conﬁdence inthe strategies proposed by ourmodel
should not be overstated.








































































































Fig.3.Consequence ofthe synthetic disaster inaneconomy with 500 PUs,withthe stochas-
tic adaptation process and different limits on the maximum number of suppliers: 1.2 times
the initial number in the upper-left panel; 1.5 in the upper-right one; 10 times in the bot-
tom-left one; and no limit in the bottom-right one. (50 simulations)
number of suppliers per PU, from 1.2 times the initial number to an unlimited
number. These simulations demonstrate that this factor is essential, suggesting that
the taking into account of microeconomic mechanisms (e.g., the transaction costs
associated with a larger number of suppliers) is needed to understand economic
resilience of natural disasters. This factor is important in the current context of re-
ductioninthenumberof suppliers,whichsuggeststhatthe costof havingmoresup-
pliers is not negligible. It is likely, therefore, that there is a trade-off between eco-
nomic efﬁciency and economic robustness. This trade-off can be investigated using
supply-chain analysis (e.g., Thomas and Grifﬁn, 1996; Beamon, 1999; Londsdale,
2004).
4.3 Sensitivity to the number of PUs
To assess how the model depends on the size of the economy that is modeled, we
compared simulations with 500 or 1000 PUs, with the same matrix density, i.e.




















































Fig. 4. Consequence of the synthetic disaster, in two economies with the same density and,
respectively, 500 PUs on the left and 1000 PUs on the right (50 simulations).
twice as many suppliers and clients per PU in the 1000x1000 matrix than in the
500x500 matrix.
Results are shown in Fig. 4. According to our simulations, at unchanged density,
the larger the economy is, the more robust it is. In the 1000-PU simulation, all
simulations show a limited reduction in production, and stabilize at a production
level that is less than 25% below the initial level. In the 500-PU simulation, many
simulations lead to a large reduction in production, including total collapses. With
unchanged density, therefore, the larger economy is more robust.
It has to be mentioned, however, that when an economy gets larger, its network
is likely to become less dense, since each PU of a larger economy does not have
to have more connections (i.e., suppliers and clients) than a same-sized PU of a
smaller economy. It is important, therefore, to investigate also the role of changes
in network density, i.e. in redundancy. This is done in the next section.
4.4 Sensitivity to redundancy in the economic system
To assess the sensitivityof the modelto the redundancy in the economic system,i.e.
to the number of suppliers and clients per PU, two sets of simulations are carried
out. In the ﬁrst one, the economy consists of 1000 PUs with normal density. In the
second one, the economy still consists of 1000 PUs, but density is double, i.e. each
PU has twice as many suppliers and clients as with normal density. Figure 5 shows
the result of this analysis. In the ﬁrst case, all simulations lead to a strong reduction
in production (by more than 50%), while all simulations of the second case show
only a limited production reduction. It is clear, therefore, that redundancy is very
efﬁcient in increasing the economy robustness to disasters, and in decreasing the
likelihood of an economic collapse after a disaster.
In the present study, we consider 500-o r1000-PU networks, instead of the 100000
PUs of the real economy of Louisiana. This limitation has consequences both in




















































Fig.5.Consequence ofthesynthetic disaster inaneconomy with1000 PUs,withthenormal
matrix density on the left and a matrix with twice as many suppliers and clients on the right
(50 simulations).
terms of network size and density. With an unchanged number of clients and sup-
pliers per PU, increasing the network size from 500 to 1000 PUs increases slightly
the economy vulnerability, as shown by the comparison of the left hand panels of
Fig. 4 and 5. Our model, therefore, is sensitive to the size of the modeled economy.
This sensitivity is an issue because it is much more difﬁcult to model a very large
economy.
From the comparison between the left hand panels of Fig. 4 and 5, it seems pos-
sible that the range of results due to adaptation stochasticity gets narrower when
the number of PUs increases. This result would be consistent with the intuition that
individual PU decisions have much more inﬂuence on the ﬁnal aggregated results
in a modeled 500-PU economy than in a real economy with tens of thousands of
PUs. As a consequence, our model results may be too sensitive to the random pro-
cesses that are introduced in the adaptation process. This sensitivity suggests that
the model needs to represent very large networks to be able to produce realistic
results, leading to difﬁcult numerical and computational problems.
4.5 Sensitivity to the inventory level
This section investigates the impact of the initial inventory level on the ability of
the economy to recover. Figure 6 shows 20 simulations of the response of the same
economy, but with different initial inventory levels in each PU. On the top panels,
we assume that all PUs have 5 days of inventory, while on the middle and bot-
tom panels, they have 5 and 10 days of inventory. Clearly, increasing inventories
from 2 to 10 days enhances the robustness to disasters. Inventories, indeed, makes
it possible for PUs to keep producing in the immediate disaster aftermath, allowing
more time for the adaptation process to take place and restore economic viabil-
ity 16 . Larger inventories, therefore, decrease the likelihood of a disaster-related
16 And, in the real world, for recovery and reconstruction to take place
































































































































































































Fig. 6. Consequence of the synthetic disaster in an economy with 500 PUs, with different
inventory levels. On the upper panels, PUs have the equivalent of 2 days of inventories; on
the middle panels, they have 5 days of inventories; on the bottom panels, they have 10 days
of inventories. The left hand panels show 20 simulations of the models in each case; the
right hand panel shows a histogram of the ﬁnal production (wrt to initial production).
economic collapse.
265 Assessing the role of direct losses heterogeneity
To create a “realistic” distribution of losses, we used the data from hurricane Ka-
trina and the damages repartition per sector described in Hallegatte (2008). In ab-
sence of any better information, we used data on the Northridge earthquake from
Tierney (1997) and considered that 60% of PUs suffered from direct losses in each
sector. Direct losses are then distributed among the affected PUs of each sector
using a lognormal probability distribution function. We chose a lognormal law to
represent the fact that high damages occur with a low probability and minor dam-
ages are very widespread (Tierney, 1997). The mean of this function is the mean
value of the damages per affected PUs in this sector, i.e. the amount of damages in
the sector divided by the number of affected PUs.
Formally, consider a sector i consisting of ni PUs. The total amount Mi of direct
losses in this sector has been determined in Hallegatte (2008): Katrina’s damages
are assumed to amount $17 billion for the government and $63.20 billion for the
privatesector,of which $30billioninthe miningsector and $5billioninthe utilities
sector, the rest being distributed according to the size of the sector. Knowing Mi
and ni for each sector, we select randomly 60% of the PUs from sector i, which we
assume to be the affected PUs. We then consider that the amount of direct losses
of each of these PUs is a random variable distributed according to a log-normal
law with parameters μ = Mi/(0.6ni) and σ (variance parameter). The log-normal










In reality, the damage variance among PUs depends on the geographical concentra-
tion of PUs: if all PUs are located in the same area, they will suffer approximately
the same amount of damages. On the opposite, if they are spread out over a large
region, or if the disaster damages are very heterogeneous, the PU losses will be
very different, and the variance will be large. This is an important point because, as
far as indirect damages are concerned, a loss of 10% of each PU productive capital
does not have the same effect on the economy as a loss of 100% of the capital of
10% of the PUs. In absence of information about the geographical distribution of
PUs, we carried out a systematic sensitivity analysis on the loss variance.
Figure 7 shows simulations of the economic response for various disasters that
cause the same losses at the sector-scale, but with different loss variance param-
eters, i.e with different losses at the PU-level. On the left-hand side, the variance
parameter is equal to 0.5, while on the right hand side, the variance parameter is
1.5. The difference in response is obvious: production losses are below 20% in all
cases when the variance is small, but reaches very large values (including collapse)
if the variance is high. For unchanged aggregated losses, therefore, the economy is
much more vulnerable to a disaster that affects heavily a few PUs than to a disas-




















































Fig. 7. Economic responses to the disaster (20 simulations), for two values of loss variance
parameter, 0.5 on the left and 1.5 on the right.
ter that slightly affects all PUs. In particular, the model suggests that an economic
collapse is likely if variance is large, while it is apparently impossible if variance is
small enough. It seems, therefore, that loss heterogeneity is an essential parameter
in the assessment of the risk of an economic systemic failure.
This result can be interpreted as a consistency issue in the economic system. In
absence of adaptation process, if all PUs are affected in the same way, and have
to reduce their production by x percent, the economic production and exchange
system remains consistent. In such a situation, the loss is minimum, equal in rel-
ative terms to the loss of each PU, i.e. x percent. Still without adaptation and in
absence of idle resources, if only one PU is affected, and if its production is re-
duced by x percent, all its clients will also have to reduce their own productions
by x percent because of input scarcity. If all PUs are connected in the network, all
PUs will ﬁnally reduce their production by x percent. So, without adaptation and
without unused resources, a x-percent loss at one PU (i.e. a very small heteroge-
neous loss) has the same aggregate impact than a x-percent loss at all PUs (i.e. a
very large homogenous loss). Adaptation in the economic network reduces the dif-
ference between these two outcomes, since a x-percent loss at one PU leads only to
a small reduction in aggregate production. But adaptation cannot cancel this effect
of heterogeneity.
In other terms, this result arises from the complementarity of intermediate goods
in an Input-Output production framework: with constant technical coefﬁcients, if
one intermediate goods is scarce, other intermediate goods cannot be used, and a
reduction of their production has no aggregate consequence. With adaptation of
technical coefﬁcient (i.e., adaptation of the economic network in our framework),
this effect is not as strong, but is still responsible for larger losses when a disaster
has heterogeneous impacts.
This result is conﬁrmed by Fig. 8, which shows the average response for various
variances ranging from 0 to 2. The most favourable case is when the variance is
null, i.e. when damages are equally distributed among the PUs of each sector. This


































Fig. 8. Average economic response to the disaster, for different values of loss variance
parameter σ.
scenario is the one that can be captured using an IO model (Hallegatte, 2008).
But it is also an unlikely scenario, since the observed variance is often very high
(e.g., Tierney, 1997). This result justiﬁes our disaggregated approach: taking into
account loss heterogeneity is found of the foremost importance. It also highlights
the need for detailed location data about production units and for spatialized loss
data. It seems, indeed, that indirect losses will strongly depend on how the disaster
footprint overlaps the localization footprint of each sector.
6 Conclusion
Our modeling framework does not pretend to allow for the assessment of the real
full cost of a disaster. We claim, however, that our analysis makes a contribution in
that it justiﬁes the development of a more disaggregated approach to model natural
disaster economic consequences. Indeed, we have showed that classical IO models
may be too optimistic, given that they stand for the most favorable case in which
risks and losses are optimally shared, that is to say in which each ﬁrm is a client
and supplier of each other ﬁrm, and in which losses are uniformly distributed.
A disaggregated approach is necessary to evaluate cost ampliﬁcations due to loss
heterogeneity and to business interactions within the production network. In par-
ticular, the cost of a disaster results from the intersection between the geographical
disaster footprint and the ﬁrm localizations. This result shows the importance of
analyses in the line of Kroll et al. (1991) and Tierney (1997) that provide detailed
information on disaster impacts at the business level.
29Moreover, the model can reproduce economic collapse, suggesting that it may
be used to investigate the existence and location of a threshold in terms of dis-
aster losses. This approach may be able, e.g., to discriminate between limited-
consequence disasters like the 2004 hurricanes in Florida and widespread-
consequences disasters leading to systemic failure like Katrina in New Orleans in
2005. It seems, for instance, that loss heterogeneity is an essential parameter in the
assessment of the risk of an economic systemic failure.
In spite of large uncertainties in the modeling approach, the model is interesting
because it suggests ways to increase the economic robustness to natural disasters.
First, economic collapse is found much less likelyif production unitsdiversifyrisks
by having many clients and suppliers and large inventories. This point suggests the
existence of a trade-off between economic efﬁciency and disaster resilience. This
issue raises the need for additional research at the supply-chain level. This result
is consistent with the well-accepted intuition that risk diversiﬁcation increases ro-
bustness. More surprisingly, however, the model suggests that recovery is easier if,
in disaster aftermath, the remaining production is allocated in priority to the least
affected businesses.In other terms, it suggeststhat maximizingeconomic resilience
can be done through the sacriﬁce of the most affected businesses. This questionable
and counter-intuitive result also needs to be investigated in more details.
Our analysis highlights also the drawbacks of our approach. First, with the small
number of production units that are modeled, results are unrealistically dependent
on the decisions made by individual production-unit managers. As a consequence,
the same disaster can lead to very different outcomes depending on these deci-
sions. This sensitivity is thought to originate from the unrealistically small size of
our model economy, and a model with a more realistic ﬁrm number may produce
more consistent results, in spite of a large number of degrees of freedom. Repro-
ducing realistic economic response may require the modeling of a much larger
economic network, which creates difﬁcult numerical and computational issues. Fu-
ture research will investigate strategies to overcome these difﬁculties, possibly in
the line of Haimes and Jiang (2001).
Finally, this analysis does not investigate factors that are of great importance,
namely the recovery and reconstruction of individual production units, the impact
of ﬁnancial bankruptcies, the existence of unused capacity (see, e.g., Hallegatte
and Ghil, 2008; West and Lenze, 1994) and the role of imports and other links with
actors located outside the affected region. Also, transportation, energy and water
infrastructures have speciﬁc characteristics that may require speciﬁc modeling ap-
proaches, in the line of, e.g., Cho et al. (2001) and Rose and Liao (2005). All these
factors have been found essential in classical IO analysis and have to be included
in any network-based analysis.
Also of the foremost importance is the shape of the economic network. Many anal-
yses on network robustness (e.g., Albert et al., 2000; Callaway et al., 2000; Holme
et al., 2002; Newman, 2003; Tanizawa et al., 2005) have concluded that real-world
30networks, which often possess power-law or other highly skewed degree distribu-
tions, are particularly robust to random node failures. Moreover, Carvalho (2008)
models the economy as a network of sectors, and ﬁnd that the existence of sectoral
hubs (i.e. sectors that provide inputs to many sectors) changes the way sectoral
shocks can cause ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic aggregate. This result proves that
the economic-network structure matters in determining the economic response to
exogenous shocks, supporting the approach followed in this article. Considering
these conclusions and their high sensitivity to network characteristics, our simplis-
tic network structure has clearly to be elaborated and validated against real data.
This work will be carried out in a follow-up paper, in which the methodologies
proposed in Carvalho (2008) will be very useful. The analysis proposed in this arti-
cle should,therefore, be consideredas the ﬁrst step of a long-termresearch program
and as an identiﬁcation of the more promising research directions.
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